15:I[18313,["/_next/static/chunks/3lc7vgunqd_rw.js","/_next/static/chunks/258jvll10h-3v.js","/_next/static/chunks/1bj-av9ysg3y1.js","/_next/static/chunks/0mvlzvvdbl276.js","/_next/static/chunks/19pif-88tkd8b.js","/_next/static/chunks/3z7qfkygc9fzx.js"],"ItemProvider"] 14:T465,{ "@context": "https://schema.org", "@type": "Article", "description": "ACTION AS WORSHIP\n\nἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις (since the end is not knowledge but action)\n\nauthor: High Priest Zevios Metathronos\n\nNear the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, before", "headline": "Knowledge & Action: Their Relation And An Act Of Worship - Library of Thoth", "author": { "@type": "Person", "name": "High Priest Zevios Metathronos" }, "datePublished": "2026-08-03T19:07:01.000Z", "dateModified": "2026-09-03T09:56:25.934Z", "articleSection": "Ancient Ethics and Philosophy", "wordCount": 1691, "mainEntityOfPage": { "@id": "https://libraryofthoth.org/item/sermon/308700-knowledge-and-action-their-relation-and-an-act-of-worship", "@type": "WebPage" }, "publisher": { "@context": "https://schema.org", "@type": "Organization", "logo": "https://zeusisgod.org/assets/img/logo-zeus.png", "name": "Temple of Zeus", "sameAs": [ "https://templeofzeus.org" ], "url": "https://templeofzeus.org" } }16:T29e6,ACTION AS WORSHIP ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις (since the end is not knowledge but action) author: High Priest Zevios Metathronos Near the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, before he has said what happiness is, before a single virtue has been named, Aristotle stops to tell us who should not be in the room. The young, he says, make poor students of ethics. Not the young in years: the young in character, the ones who follow feeling wherever it runs. Their problem is not that they cannot follow the lectures. Their problem is what they intend to do with them, which is nothing. And then he gives the reason, in eight words that could stand as the motto of the whole work: ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. "Since the end is not knowledge, but action." (Nicomachean Ethics I.3, 1095a5-6) Sit with that. The most systematic knower the ancient world produced, the founder of logic, the man who catalogued constitutions, dissected cuttlefish, and sorted the sciences into their kinds, opens his book on the good life by demoting knowledge and saying it's not the point, but that the point is for action to take place based on knowledge. Knowledge is not the end. Knowledge is for something. It leads elsewhere: in what you do. The Zevist reads this line and recognizes it at once, because Greek religion knew it long before Greek philosophy wrote it down. I. The Verb for Sacrifice Means "To Do" Buried in the oldest layer of the Greek language sits a fact that settles the whole question. In Homer, the ordinary verbs for "to do," ῥέζειν and ἔρδειν, are also the verbs for offering sacrifice. ἱερὰ ῥέζειν: literally, "to do the holy things." When the Achaean host turns to Heaven before battle, the poet does not report what the men believed. He reports what they did: ἄλλος δ᾽ ἄλλῳ ἔρεζε θεῶν αἰειγενετάων, "each man made offering to one of the everlasting Gods" (Iliad II.400). This is no accident of poetry. Hellenic religion was a religion of practice, what scholars now call orthopraxy, not a religion of doctrine. There was no creed to recite, no catechism to pass, no examination in empty verbal theology at the temple door. What you owed the Gods was deeds: the libation before the meal, the altar tended, the oath kept, the meditation done, the offering given to the Temple, the life lived, the festival honoured in its season. A man's piety was not a condition of his opinions. Opinions merely were mostly empty. It was a pattern in his conduct, visible to his neighbours and to Heaven alike. So when Aristotle writes that the end is not knowledge but action, he is not announcing a novelty. He is carrying into philosophy what the altars had always taught. The lecture hall and the temple agree: the holy things are things done. All knowledge of the Ancient Mysteries, Meditation and Theurgy, is knowledge that is actionable: It must be practiced and lived, not emptily believed in. -FAHP Zevios Metathronos II. The Patient Who Will Not Take the Medicine Aristotle knew his audience, and he knew what lecture halls breed. His diagnosis, delivered twenty-three centuries ago, has not aged a day: ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ᾽ οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. "But the many do not do these things. They take refuge in argument, thinking that they are doing philosophy and that this will make them good, behaving like patients who listen carefully to their doctors but do nothing that is prescribed." (Nicomachean Ethics II.4, 1105b12-16) Take refuge: καταφεύγοντες. Argument as a hiding place. And just as such treatment will never heal the body, he adds, this kind of philosophizing will never heal the soul. We now live in the largest lecture hall ever built. Courses, podcasts, summaries of summaries, a library in every pocket. Never has so much been known about excellence by people standing perfectly still. The trap is stronger than it was in Athens, because consuming knowledge now feels like action: highlight, save, share, repeat. There is a sensation of motion. There is no movement. Aristotle will not allow the confusion. He states the purpose of his own book with a bluntness that should embarrass half the shelves of every bookshop: οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ ἵν᾽ ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα. "For we are not inquiring in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good." (Nicomachean Ethics II.2, 1103b27-28) Otherwise, he adds dryly, the inquiry would be of no use at all. III. You Become What You Repeatedly Do Why can action accomplish what knowledge alone cannot? Because of how souls are built. Aristotle's answer is habituation, and his example is the workshop: ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. "The things we must learn to do, we learn by doing them: men become builders by building, and lyre-players by playing the lyre." (Nicomachean Ethics II.1, 1103a32-34) So too, he continues, we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. Each act cuts a groove. The grooves deepen into a ἕξις, a settled disposition. Character is the sediment of practice. The soul is not informed into virtue; it is trained into it, the way hands are trained. This is why the Four Levels of Evolution are climbed, not merely understood. The body is not persuaded into strength; it is trained, lift by lift, mile by mile. Emotion is not argued into order; it is disciplined by a thousand small refusals and a thousand small consents. Even reason, the third level, is a practice before it is a possession: no one thinks clearly because he once read a book about thinking clearly. And Spirit, the fourth level, comes last precisely because it demands the whole prior labour. There is no elevator in the ascent. There are only stairs, and stairs exist to be climbed. IV. Energeia: The Highest Things Are Activities Here someone objects: did Aristotle not crown contemplation in the end? Does the prize not return to knowledge after all? Read him more carefully. When he finally defines the human good, he does not say knowledge, and he does not say possession of virtue either. He says activity: τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ᾽ ἀρετήν. "The human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue." (Nicomachean Ethics I.7, 1098a16-17) ἐνέργεια: being-at-work. Not a certificate, not a state, not a store of truths, but the working itself. A man asleep can possess every virtue and it profits him nothing. And Aristotle reaches for an image every Hellene would feel in his chest: ὥσπερ δ᾽ Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι. "As at Olympia it is not the finest and strongest who are crowned, but those who compete." (Nicomachean Ethics I.8, 1099a3-5) The crown goes to the one in the arena. So it is in life, he says: the noble and good things belong to those who act rightly, οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς. And this principle runs to the very top of reality. Aristotle's divine mind is not a warehouse of omniscience. It is pure ἐνέργεια, eternal activity: ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, "the activity of mind is life" (Metaphysics XII.7, 1072b26-27). Even contemplation, the θεωρία he honours above all, is not knowledge held but knowing enacted: the difference between owning a lyre and playing it. When the mind is at work on the highest things, the knower and the known become one living act. The divine does not have. The divine does. So even at the summit, the teaching holds. The end was never the file of stored facts. The end is a life at work. The Gods do measure us by our deeds, our actions and consequences: What we applied; not what we "claimed" we applied. -FAHP Zevios Metathronos V. Every Right Act Is an Offering Now set the two halves side by side. The oldest religion of the Hellenes: worship is something done. The deepest ethics of the Hellenes: the good is something done. The Zevist joins them and states the conclusion plainly. Right action is worship. Zeus gains nothing from your information about him. He is not honoured because you can recite his epithets, date his temples, or diagram the theology. He is honoured the way he has always been honoured: by things done. The ancients brought barley, wine, and hecatombs. The Zevist brings those offerings too, and one offering more, the whole field of conduct. Keep your word when keeping it costs you. Train the body you were given. Master the anger before it masters you. Do just work, justly. Tell the truth when the lie would be cheaper. Each of these is ἱερὰ ῥέζειν, a doing of the holy things. The altar stands wherever you act rightly on purpose. This is not a softening of worship into metaphor. It is the recovery of what worship meant. The libation was never magic; it was practice, a visible act binding the one who acts to the divine order. When you act with courage, justice, and temperance, you offer up the only thing that was ever fully yours to give: your conduct. Prayer without practice is flattery. Study without practice is decoration. A Zevist who can quote every line of the Ethics and acts on none of it has built a library, not a life. The Gods do not read libraries. They watch what you do. So end where Aristotle begins. Learn: study hard, read the texts, sharpen the mind, for a Zevist who cannot think clearly is a liability. But never mistake the preparation for the end. Knowledge prepares. Action completes. The lecture ends, and the altar is waiting. Do the holy things. Knowledge is the prescription and actionable knowledge is the crown of wisdom. But the head that wears the crown, is where action sits. -FAHP Zevios Metathronos -HPZM17:T2d8f,ACTION AS WORSHIP

ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις (since the end is not knowledge but action)

author: High Priest Zevios Metathronos

Near the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, before he has said what happiness is, before a single virtue has been named, Aristotle stops to tell us who should not be in the room. The young, he says, make poor students of ethics. Not the young in years: the young in character, the ones who follow feeling wherever it runs. Their problem is not that they cannot follow the lectures. Their problem is what they intend to do with them, which is nothing. And then he gives the reason, in eight words that could stand as the motto of the whole work:

ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις.
"Since the end is not knowledge, but action." (Nicomachean Ethics I.3, 1095a5-6)

Sit with that. The most systematic knower the ancient world produced, the founder of logic, the man who catalogued constitutions, dissected cuttlefish, and sorted the sciences into their kinds, opens his book on the good life by demoting knowledge and saying it's not the point, but that the point is for action to take place based on knowledge. Knowledge is not the end. Knowledge is for something. It leads elsewhere: in what you do.

The Zevist reads this line and recognizes it at once, because Greek religion knew it long before Greek philosophy wrote it down.

I. The Verb for Sacrifice Means "To Do"

Buried in the oldest layer of the Greek language sits a fact that settles the whole question. In Homer, the ordinary verbs for "to do," ῥέζειν and ἔρδειν, are also the verbs for offering sacrifice. ἱερὰ ῥέζειν: literally, "to do the holy things." When the Achaean host turns to Heaven before battle, the poet does not report what the men believed. He reports what they did: ἄλλος δ᾽ ἄλλῳ ἔρεζε θεῶν αἰειγενετάων, "each man made offering to one of the everlasting Gods" (Iliad II.400).

This is no accident of poetry. Hellenic religion was a religion of practice, what scholars now call orthopraxy, not a religion of doctrine. There was no creed to recite, no catechism to pass, no examination in empty verbal theology at the temple door. What you owed the Gods was deeds: the libation before the meal, the altar tended, the oath kept, the meditation done, the offering given to the Temple, the life lived, the festival honoured in its season. A man's piety was not a condition of his opinions. Opinions merely were mostly empty. It was a pattern in his conduct, visible to his neighbours and to Heaven alike.

So when Aristotle writes that the end is not knowledge but action, he is not announcing a novelty. He is carrying into philosophy what the altars had always taught. The lecture hall and the temple agree: the holy things are things done.

All knowledge of the Ancient Mysteries, Meditation and Theurgy, is knowledge that is actionable: It must be practiced and lived, not emptily believed in.
-FAHP Zevios Metathronos

II. The Patient Who Will Not Take the Medicine

Aristotle knew his audience, and he knew what lecture halls breed. His diagnosis, delivered twenty-three centuries ago, has not aged a day:

ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ᾽ οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων.

"But the many do not do these things. They take refuge in argument, thinking that they are doing philosophy and that this will make them good, behaving like patients who listen carefully to their doctors but do nothing that is prescribed." (Nicomachean Ethics II.4, 1105b12-16)

Take refuge: καταφεύγοντες. Argument as a hiding place. And just as such treatment will never heal the body, he adds, this kind of philosophizing will never heal the soul.

We now live in the largest lecture hall ever built. Courses, podcasts, summaries of summaries, a library in every pocket. Never has so much been known about excellence by people standing perfectly still. The trap is stronger than it was in Athens, because consuming knowledge now feels like action: highlight, save, share, repeat. There is a sensation of motion. There is no movement.

Aristotle will not allow the confusion. He states the purpose of his own book with a bluntness that should embarrass half the shelves of every bookshop:

οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ ἵν᾽ ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα.
"For we are not inquiring in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good." (Nicomachean Ethics II.2, 1103b27-28)

Otherwise, he adds dryly, the inquiry would be of no use at all.

III. You Become What You Repeatedly Do

Why can action accomplish what knowledge alone cannot? Because of how souls are built. Aristotle's answer is habituation, and his example is the workshop:

ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί.
"The things we must learn to do, we learn by doing them: men become builders by building, and lyre-players by playing the lyre." (Nicomachean Ethics II.1, 1103a32-34)

So too, he continues, we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. Each act cuts a groove. The grooves deepen into a ἕξις, a settled disposition. Character is the sediment of practice. The soul is not informed into virtue; it is trained into it, the way hands are trained.

This is why the Four Levels of Evolution are climbed, not merely understood. The body is not persuaded into strength; it is trained, lift by lift, mile by mile. Emotion is not argued into order; it is disciplined by a thousand small refusals and a thousand small consents. Even reason, the third level, is a practice before it is a possession: no one thinks clearly because he once read a book about thinking clearly. And Spirit, the fourth level, comes last precisely because it demands the whole prior labour. There is no elevator in the ascent. There are only stairs, and stairs exist to be climbed.

IV. Energeia: The Highest Things Are Activities

Here someone objects: did Aristotle not crown contemplation in the end? Does the prize not return to knowledge after all? Read him more carefully. When he finally defines the human good, he does not say knowledge, and he does not say possession of virtue either. He says activity:

τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ᾽ ἀρετήν.
"The human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue." (Nicomachean Ethics I.7, 1098a16-17)

ἐνέργεια: being-at-work. Not a certificate, not a state, not a store of truths, but the working itself. A man asleep can possess every virtue and it profits him nothing. And Aristotle reaches for an image every Hellene would feel in his chest:

ὥσπερ δ᾽ Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι.
"As at Olympia it is not the finest and strongest who are crowned, but those who compete." (Nicomachean Ethics I.8, 1099a3-5)

The crown goes to the one in the arena. So it is in life, he says: the noble and good things belong to those who act rightly, οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς.

And this principle runs to the very top of reality. Aristotle's divine mind is not a warehouse of omniscience. It is pure ἐνέργεια, eternal activity: ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, "the activity of mind is life" (Metaphysics XII.7, 1072b26-27). Even contemplation, the θεωρία he honours above all, is not knowledge held but knowing enacted: the difference between owning a lyre and playing it. When the mind is at work on the highest things, the knower and the known become one living act. The divine does not have. The divine does.

So even at the summit, the teaching holds. The end was never the file of stored facts. The end is a life at work.

The Gods do measure us by our deeds, our actions and consequences: What we applied; not what we "claimed" we applied.
-FAHP Zevios Metathronos

V. Every Right Act Is an Offering

Now set the two halves side by side. The oldest religion of the Hellenes: worship is something done. The deepest ethics of the Hellenes: the good is something done. The Zevist joins them and states the conclusion plainly. Right action is worship.

Zeus gains nothing from your information about him. He is not honoured because you can recite his epithets, date his temples, or diagram the theology. He is honoured the way he has always been honoured: by things done. The ancients brought barley, wine, and hecatombs. The Zevist brings those offerings too, and one offering more, the whole field of conduct. Keep your word when keeping it costs you. Train the body you were given. Master the anger before it masters you. Do just work, justly. Tell the truth when the lie would be cheaper. Each of these is ἱερὰ ῥέζειν, a doing of the holy things. The altar stands wherever you act rightly on purpose.

This is not a softening of worship into metaphor. It is the recovery of what worship meant. The libation was never magic; it was practice, a visible act binding the one who acts to the divine order. When you act with courage, justice, and temperance, you offer up the only thing that was ever fully yours to give: your conduct.

Prayer without practice is flattery. Study without practice is decoration. A Zevist who can quote every line of the Ethics and acts on none of it has built a library, not a life. The Gods do not read libraries. They watch what you do.

So end where Aristotle begins. Learn: study hard, read the texts, sharpen the mind, for a Zevist who cannot think clearly is a liability. But never mistake the preparation for the end. Knowledge prepares. Action completes. The lecture ends, and the altar is waiting.

Do the holy things.

Knowledge is the prescription and actionable knowledge is the crown of wisdom. But the head that wears the crown, is where action sits.
-FAHP Zevios Metathronos

-HPZM18:T2d8f,ACTION AS WORSHIP

ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις (since the end is not knowledge but action)

author: High Priest Zevios Metathronos

Near the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, before he has said what happiness is, before a single virtue has been named, Aristotle stops to tell us who should not be in the room. The young, he says, make poor students of ethics. Not the young in years: the young in character, the ones who follow feeling wherever it runs. Their problem is not that they cannot follow the lectures. Their problem is what they intend to do with them, which is nothing. And then he gives the reason, in eight words that could stand as the motto of the whole work:

ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις.
"Since the end is not knowledge, but action." (Nicomachean Ethics I.3, 1095a5-6)

All knowledge of the Ancient Mysteries, Meditation and Theurgy, is knowledge that is actionable: It must be practiced and lived, not emptily believed in.
-FAHP Zevios Metathronos

II. The Patient Who Will Not Take the Medicine

Aristotle knew his audience, and he knew what lecture halls breed. His diagnosis, delivered twenty-three centuries ago, has not aged a day:

ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ᾽ οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων.

"But the many do not do these things. They take refuge in argument, thinking that they are doing philosophy and that this will make them good, behaving like patients who listen carefully to their doctors but do nothing that is prescribed." (Nicomachean Ethics II.4, 1105b12-16)

οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ ἵν᾽ ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα.
"For we are not inquiring in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good." (Nicomachean Ethics II.2, 1103b27-28)

ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί.
"The things we must learn to do, we learn by doing them: men become builders by building, and lyre-players by playing the lyre." (Nicomachean Ethics II.1, 1103a32-34)

τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ᾽ ἀρετήν.
"The human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue." (Nicomachean Ethics I.7, 1098a16-17)

ὥσπερ δ᾽ Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι.
"As at Olympia it is not the finest and strongest who are crowned, but those who compete." (Nicomachean Ethics I.8, 1099a3-5)

The Gods do measure us by our deeds, our actions and consequences: What we applied; not what we "claimed" we applied.
-FAHP Zevios Metathronos

Knowledge is the prescription and actionable knowledge is the crown of wisdom. But the head that wears the crown, is where action sits.
-FAHP Zevios Metathronos

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